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COMMENTS
THE TEN DOLLAR FEE LIMIT FOR ATTORNEYS
WHO REPRESENT VETERANS IN VETERANS'
BENEFITS PROCEEDINGS-AN ANACHRONISM?
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, the United States government has had a
special concern for helping those who are disabled as a result of mili-
tary service. The government has given federal assistance with the
goal of doing everything possible to help the disabled veteran read-
just to civilian life.' Despite this concern, veterans are being deprived
of an effective means of challenging the denial of veterans' service-
connected death and disability benefits (hereinafter "SCDD") be-
cause of an outdated statute, 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c)(2). This statute
states that fees paid to attorneys who represent veterans in veterans'
benefits proceedings (up to the point at which the Board of Veterans'
Appeals issues a decision) shall not exceed ten dollars. Because of
this cap on fees, most attorneys are unwilling to handle veterans'
benefits cases. The fee limit is outdated because it no longer equals
four percent of the soldier's salary as it did in 1864 when the law
was first enacted. Furthermore, the process has become much more
complicated, requiring more than filling out one simple form.'
This legislation stands despite its similarity to the Federal Em-
ployment Compensation Act (hereinafter "FECA") and social secur-
ity proceedings which allow for representation by counsel with no
fee limit. The benefits in those cases are not based on need, a in
welfare hearings where the claimants are indigents who cannot af-
ford legal assistance, but on disability, as in veterans' hearings. The
C 1989 by Marguerite R. Caruso
1. S. REP. No. 746, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4555, 4564.
2. Brauchli, From the Wool Sack, 14 COLO. LAW. 1815 (1985).
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only limit on attorneys' fees in FECA and social security proceedings
is a determination by the agency that the fees are reasonable.' Given
the similarities among the statutes and the common policy of aiding
the disabled, the only limit on attorneys' fees in veterans' benefits
hearings should be reasonableness.
Section 3404(c)(2) has been held constitutional under the fifth
amendment4 of the United States Constitution by the United States
Supreme Court in Walters v. National Association of Radiation
Survivors5 because it meets the Mathews v. Eldridge6 test for due
process. That test is whether the cost, or government interest (fiscal
or administrative cost of added or substitute procedure), outweighs
the benefit. The benefit includes: 1) the private interest that will be
affected by the official action and 2) the reduction in the risk of erro-
neous deprivation of such interest through the added or substitute
procedure.' The government interest in section 3404(c)(2), according
to the Supreme Court in Walters, included: 1) the desire to prevent
lawyers from receiving large portions of veterans' awards, 2) the goal
of preventing adversarial proceedings which might slow the process
and make it more difficult for veterans to receive awards, and 3) the
prevention of the added administrative cost of allowing attorneys,
which would eventually deplete the amount of money available for
3. In Federal Employment Compensation Act proceedings, claimants may be repre-
sented by any person they choose. 5 U.S.C. § 8127(a) (1970); 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.142-.143
(1976). An applicant for benefits receives the following notice: "Does an employee need an
attorney or other representative in order to file a claim for compensation? This is not neces-
sary. If desired, however, the employee may obtain the services of an attorney or other person
for representation." EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
FEDERAL INJURY COMPENSATION 9 (rev. ed. 1980). A representative may not collect a fee
unless it is approved by the agency. 5 U.S.C. § 8127(b) (1970).
In Social Security proceedings claimants may be represented by anyone. 42 U.S.C. §
406(a) (1970). If a claimant asks about representation, he is given a form suggesting that it
may not be necessary: "You have the right to be represented by a person of your choice. ...
This does not mean that you will need a representative. Most people handle their social secur-
ity affairs themselves with the help of the people in the social security office. ... SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEP'T. OF HEW. Form SSI-75, Social Security and Your Right
to Representation (Sept. 1970). A representative may not collect a fee, however, unless the
agency determines that it is reasonable. 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1970). The agency will help an
attorney co!lect a reasonable fee by paying him directly up to 25% of a past-due award. Id.
This is not a ceiling on the amount of the fee. However, there is a ceiling of 25% of past-due
benefits for representation in court. Id. § 406(b)(1).
4. The fifth amendment provides: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
6. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
7 It1 at 334-39
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veterans' benefits.8 The government interest outweighed the benefit
because, according to the Supreme Court, the Veterans' Administra-
tion (VA) proceedings provided adequate due process to veterans,
and the private interest in having an attorney was not that substan-
tial because the VA process was not adversarial, and there were ade-
quate representatives in the VA to help the veteran.'
However, recent developments show that the government inter-
est does not include the prevention of adversarial proceedings be-
cause disinterested third parties may, without any barriers, pay at-
torneys to represent veterans." The government interest is also
weakened because of recent VA actions which resulted in an order
that compelled the VA to pay attorneys' fees and costs and $15,000
to the court for wasting its time.1 The award was based on a finding
that the VA had frustrated discovery on the issue of whether the VA
provides due process in complex cases for veterans' benefits." The
VA's behavior weakens the government interest because it defeats the
goal of lowering administrative cost by not allowing attorney repre-
sentation. In other words, if the VA can afford to pay damage
awards, it can afford to allow attorneys into its proceedings.
In addition, a VA staff attorney's analysis concluded that there
are constitutional inadequacies in the SCDD process' 8 which in-
crease the risk of erroneous deprivation in VA proceedings. This
would also show an increase in the private interest in having an at-
torney, since it follows from this finding that the VA provides inade-
quate representation to veterans.
These developments weaken the Supreme Court's reasoning in
finding section 3404(c)(2) to be constitutional and at the same time
support the lower court's opinion in Walters that 3404(c)(2) is un-
constitutional. In addition, these developments signal a need for Con-
gress to amend section 3404(c)(2) by somehow raising the fee which
an attorney can receive in SCDD proceedings.
This comment discusses the congressional, administrative, andjudicial history behind section 3404(c)(2) in sections II.A., II.B., and
II.C., respectively. Section II.D. discusses a recent analysis of SCDD
proceedings done by a VA staff attorney. The comment then ana-
lyzes the historical aspects of 3404(c)(2) and the VA staff attorney's
8. Walters, 473 U.S. at 321-26.
9. Id. at 326-31.
10. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
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analysis in Section III. Finally, this comment proposes section
3404(c)(2) amendments, which respond to history and recent devel-
opments, in Section IV.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Congressional History
Section 3404(c)(2) of Title 38, which now prevents veterans
from spending more than ten dollars to hire an attorney, was first
written to protect disabled war veterans. 14 Congress adopted this fee
limit during the Civil War to protect claimants from greedy lawyers
who might take advantage of veterans by taking a large percentage
of their benefits as legal fees.1" In addition, section 3405 imposes
criminal penalties on anyone receiving remuneration above the fee
limit. 16
In 1982, the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs reviewed
the ten dollar fee limitation. The Committee recognized that the
limit was imposed to protect veterans from unscrupulous lawyers.1
They went on, however, to state that whatever the basis might have
been for the original limit, and despite numerous court cases af-
firming the validity of the limit against challenges to its constitution-
ality, it was the Committee's position that such a view of today's bar,
14. 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c)(2) (1982) states:
The Administrator shall determine and pay fees to agents or attorneys recog-
nized under this section in allowed claims for monetary benefits under' laws
administered by the Veterans' Administration. Such fees (I) shall be determined
and paid as prescribed by the Administrator; (2) shall not exceed $10 with re-
spect to any one claim; and (3) shall be deducted from monetary benefits
claimed and allowed.
15. The War Risk Act of 1917 passed during World War I continued this limit. In
1918, an amendment was proposed to the War Risk Act to limit the fee to three dollars in
response to complaints that unscrupulous claims agents and attorneys were canvassing WWI
veterans, fabricating claims, and harassing families of veterans into initiating claims under the
new act. 56 CONG. REC., 5216, 5220-22 (Apr. 17, 1918). However, when codified, the limit
remained at ten dollars and the Consolidation Act of 1930, which created the Veterans' Ad-
ministration, preserved the ten dollar limit. S. REP. No. 466, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1982)
(stating the purpose of the original fee limit).
16.
Whoever (1) directly or indirectly solicits, contracts for, charges, or receives, or
attempts to solicit, contract for, charge, or receive, any fee or compensation ex-
cept as provided in section(s) 3404 . . . or (2) wrongfully withholds from any
claimant or beneficiary any part of a benefit or claim allowed and due him,
shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned at hard labor for not more than
two years, or both.
38 U.S.C. § 3405 (1982).
17. S. REP. No. 466, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1982).
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especially with its network of state and local bar associations that
now police attorneys' practices, was no longer valid.18
The Committee felt the current limit was an undue restriction
on the rights of veterans and other claimants to hire legal assistance
of their choice in VA proceedings. 1 ' An individual, for instance,
might desire an attorney because of concern that the claim might be
denied a second time by the Board of Veterans' Appeals [hereinafter
"BVA"]. In addition, the claimant might feel that any development
in the record in a complex case would be of extreme importance
while still before the agency and that, therefore, an attorney would
be more able to develop the record than the individual working with
a service representative provided by the VA.2
In light of this view and legislative history which showed that
the fee limit was intended to apply only to payment for simple cleri-
cal tasks,$' the Senate proposed amendments to Title 38 section
3404(c)(2) which would have lifted the ten dollar fee limit after an
adverse decision by the BVA. The amendment would have allowed
the Administrator to approve a reasonable fee not in excess of $500
or if a contingent fee agreement existed, not greater than twenty-five
percent of the benefits awarded." The formula proposed by the Sen-
ate amendments for determining the fee is similar to section 406(a)
of the Social Security Act, with'the only difference being that in
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. In order to secure benefits, a claimant presents a claim to one of 58 regional
Veterans' Administration (VA) offices. The claimant must show both the occurrence of death
or disability and its connection to service in the line of duty. A rating panel of medical, legal,
and occupational specialists determines whether to grant or deny the claim. The rating is based
on a complex schedule involving analysis of a variety of medical ailments. After a claimant is
notified of the decision, he or she may challenge it by filing a Notice of Disagreement within
one year or the decision will be final.
Based on the Notice of Disagreement, the VA either reverses its decision or prepares a
statement of the case (Statement) in which the issue for appeal is stated. After receiving the
Statement, the claimant must file a Substantive Appeal within 60 days. The appeal must allege
specific errors of fact or law and any exceptions not taken are considered waived..
After filing the Substantive Appeal, the claim is turned over to the Board of Veterans'
Appeals (BVA) in Washington, D.C.. The BVA reviews the entire record and is not formally
required to defer to the regional VA holding. BVA decisions are final, but may be reconsidered
if 1) there are allegations of error in fact or law or 2) upon discovery of new evidence. There is
no judicial review of BVA decisions. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982). Note, Walters v. National
Association of Radiation Survivors: Disabled Veterans' Right to Counsel Denied, 19 J. MAR-
SHALL L. Rav. 773, 773 n.2 (1986).
21. S. Rip. No. 466, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1982) (statement of the original purpose
of the attorney fee limit).
22. Id. at 52.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1982).
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addition to the contingent fee percentage, the bill incorporated a
$500 maximum fee as an alternative. 4In 1986, for the fourth consecutive term, the Senate passed a
bill raising the ten dollar ceiling on attorneys' fees and adopting the
proposed amendments.2 5 The bill died in the House, 6 but for the
first time, Sonny Montgomery, Chairman of the House Veterans'
Affairs Committee and a strong opponent of the legislation, agreed to
allow hearings and a vote on H.R. 585, a bill mirroring the bill that
passed in the Senate. 7 Although it had over 230 House co-sponsors,
the Committee tabled the bill with a vote of twenty to twelve. 28
In October 1988, a compromise bill, S. 11, was passed by the
Senate. For the first time in history, the bill gave veterans the right
to appeal BVA decisions. The bill allows appeals to a "newly cre-
ated, independent specialty court" in Washington, D.C. to be estab-
lished on September 1, 1989.9 The United States court of Veteran's
Appeals would have between three and seven judges who could re-
view all claims for benefits which met the proper standard of review.
The standard of review set out in S. 11 states that appeals could be
considered if BVA decisions were "clearly erroneous.""0
S. 11 also states that on appeal to the new specialty court, the
ten dollar fee limit would be lifted and "reasonable fees" allowed."
Finally, S. 11 provides that veterans could appeal cases challenging
laws and regulations, but not individual factual questions, to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The United
States Supreme Court could then review those decisions. 2
B. Recent Administrative Developments
Although the 1986 legislative challenge to the ten dollar fee
limit failed and the 1989 changes leave the fee limit intact up to an
24. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
25. S. 367, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
26. H.R. 585, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
27. Snyder, Stichman, & Wildhaber, Developments in Veterans' Law in 1986, 20
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1208, 1209 (1987) (hereinafter Developments in 1986].
28. Id. at 1209.
29. Cowen, Veterans Gain Right to Seek Judicial Review, 46 CONG. Q. 3058, 3059
(1988).
30. Id. at 3058. The bill also provides that the BVA become more independent of the
VA in order to produce more "consistently objective opinions." This independence would be
accomplished by requiring the BVA chairman to be appointed by the president and confirmed
by the Senate. In addition, board members would receive nine-year appointments. Id. at 3058-
59.
31. Id. at 3059.
32. Id.
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appeal to the new specialty court, there was an administrative deci-
sion on January 28, 1986, which produced a different result."3 Assis-
tant Attorney General Charles Cooper affirmed the validity of third
parties subsidizing attorneys to represent veterans as not violating
the ten dollar fee limit.34 The opinion was sought by the VA Gen-
eral Counsel, who challenged a program established by the Los An-
geles Legal Assistance Foundation and a program established by the
state of Oregon."
Under the Legal Assistance Foundation program, there was a
contract with a private attorney to pay $300 for veterans' cases
presented to the VA Regional Office. 6 In Oregon, the legislature
directed the state to create a program to pay attorneys to represent
certain war veterans.87
The VA's position is that as long as independent third parties
pay, there is no violation of the statute. However, a payment that
directly or indirectly diminished the veteran's benefits would be in-
consistent with the purpose of protecting benefits recovered by a vet-
eran and the goal of protecting veterans from unscrupulous
lawyers.88
This opinion settled any doubts about the legality of legal ser-
vices offices using private bar funds to retain attorneys to represent
veterans. 9 According to the Assistant Attorney General, there are no
requirements or limits on disinterested third parties hiring attorneys
to represent veterans except that any retainer agreement between a
third party and an attorney should recite the language of 38 U.S.C.
§ 3404 and § 3405 and include a declaration that no payments to the
attorney will directly or indirectly decrease the veteran's benefits.
Also, a separate document showing the veteran's acknowledgement of
this latter statement should be obtained.40
33. Op. Ass't Att'y Gen. Charles Cooper (Jan. 28, 1986), reported in U.S. Agrees Law-
yers Can Be Paid Over $10 on VA Cases, 5 VETERANS RTs. NEWSL. 73 Jan./Feb. 1986).
34. Id. at 73.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 86
39. Id.
40. Id.
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C. Recent Judicial History
1. National Association of Radiation Survivors v. Walters41
Apart from legislative history and recent administrative devel-
opments, the ten dollar fee limit's recent judicial history is interest-
ing. In 1984, in National Association of Radiation Survivors v.
Walters,42 a district court in California imposed a preliminary in-
junction forbidding the enforcement of section 3404(c)(2) on the
ground that it violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
The court relied on Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy48 which said
" 'due process,' unlike some legal rules, [was] not a technical concep-
tion with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances."44
In other words, even though in previous years the cost may have
outweighed the benefit,48 the balance had changed over time so that
the district court felt the statute was no longer constitutional. Under
the flexible due process test, the statute could not remain the same,
but had to transform according to the social and economic advances
of the times.
a. The Private Interest Affected by the Ten Dollar Fee
Limit
First, the district court looked at the private interest that was
affected by the fee limit. It found the interest to be substantial be-
cause many of the plaintiffs were totally or primarily dependent on
veterans' SCDD benefits,"" and VA proceedings were the sole rem-
edy against the government.4
41. 589 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
42. Id.
43. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
44. Id. at 895.
45. See supra text accompanying note 7 for a review of the fifth amendment due process
balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
46. Plaintiff Albert Maxwell was not able to hold a steady job since 1978 due to service-
connected disability. He was forced to sell his home and declare bankruptcy. Maxwell and his
wife are now dependent on the VA benefits for subsistence. In addition, at the time of the
district court decision, plaintiff Reason Wareheime's claim for radiation disability had been
pending after five years of deliberations. During that time Wareheime and his wife relied
exclusively on VA benefits for subsistence. Brief for the National Association of Atomic Veter-
ans as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 4-5, Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (No. 84-571).
47. Waiters, 589 F. Supp. at 1314. Veterans cannot sue for disabilities stemming from
military service under the Federal Torts Claims Act. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135
(1950). Also, 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982) provides that there is no judicial review of BVA
[Vol. 29
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b. The Likelihood that Attorneys Would Avoid the Risk
of Erroneous Deprivation Generally and the Risk of Erroneous
Deprivation of the Private Interest Through the Present Procedure
The district court then discussed the likelihood that the use of
attorneys would avoid any risk of erroneous deprivation of the pri-
vate interest involved. The court discussed many cases where attor-
neys were praised and considered a vital support of due process. For
example, in Goldberg v. Kelly," the United States Supreme Court
required that all welfare recipients be permitted to retain counsel
prior to having benefits terminated in a hearing before the agency
because "[clounsel [could] help delineate the issues, present the fac-
tual contentions in an orderly manner, conduct cross-examination,
and generally safeguard the interests of the recipient." ' Other cir-
cuits, noted the district court, had also required that persons be al-
lowed to retain counsel in agency hearings. For instance, in review-
ing denials of social security disability claims, courts had stressed the
importance of representation of counsel by considering the lack of
representation by counsel as a reason for reversing or remanding the
Secretary's decision.5
The district court in Walters noted that, in contrast to other
hearings where the claimant could retain counsel in post-termination
hearings or judicial proceedings, the veteran had no opportunity to
retain counsel because 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) allowed no judicial re-
view, and the fee limit applied to pre- and post-termination proceed-
ings."1 Even in Mathews v. Eldridge,52 the claimant for social secur-
ity disability benefits had a right to a full evidentiary post-
termination review with the assistance of counsel at both the agency
and court proceedings.
Adequate representation by counsel was also needed, according
to the district court, because claims for service connected benefits
turned on difficult medical analyses which determined the degree of
disability, and proof of service connection might raise causation is-
decisions. This has changed since S. 11 now provides judicial review of BVA decisions by the
newly created specialty court. Cowen, supra note 29, at 3059.
48. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
49. Id. at 270-71.
50. See, e.g., Deblois v. Secretary of HHS, 686 F.2d 76, 80-81 (lst Cir. 1982); Echevar-
ria v. Secretary of HHS, 685 F.2d 751, 755 (2d Cir. 1982); Smith v. Secretary of HEW, 587
F.2d 857, 860 (7th Cir. 1978); Webb v. Finch, 431 F.2d 1179 (6th Cir. 1970).
51. Walters, 589 F. Supp. at 1317.
52. 424 U.S. 319, 339, 349 (1976).
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sues which required both medically and legally complex analyses.5 3
In addition to this complicated substantive analysis, the district court
found that the undisputed factual evidence showed claimants faced
complex procedural requirements including statutes and regulations
which if not followed would result in denial of their claims.5
In order to wade through the procedural and substantive com-
plexities, the VA regulations contemplated representation by a rec-
ommended service organization, attorney, agent, or other authorized
person.55 The regulations expressly stated that "[iut [w]as the obliga-
tion of the Veterans' Administration to assist a claimant in develop-
ing the facts pertinent to his [or her] claim and to render a decision
which grant[ed] him [or her] every benefit that [could] be supported
in law while protecting the interests of the Government."56 How-
ever, the district court found that claims examiners were allowed
only 2.84 hours to develop the facts underlying each claim, and their
performance was measured in part by the speed with which they
processed claims. 7
The VA's inability to devote time and resources to each claim
was apparent to the district court in the factual development done on
each case. The VA rarely went beyond accumulating medical and
service records of veterans involved, and the court noted that the VA
rarely subpoenaed documents to support a claimant's claim pursuant
to 38 U.S.C. § 3311. In fact since 1979, only five subpoenas were
issued and some were used to disprove rather than support the
claim.58
In addition, the court found that the VA undercut the proce-
dural right to request a hearing until after an initial determination
had been made, even though this precluded claimants from having
53. Walters, 589 F. Supp. at 1319. This is particularly evident in cases where claimants
seek to obtain benefits for death or disability arising from such causes as exposure to atomic
radiation or Agent Orange, or from Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome ("PTSS"). Such claims
often require "more legal and procedural complexities than do many judicially litigated mat-
ters . . . ." Id. at 1320.
54. Id. at 1319. A claimant must follow regulations published in many sources includ-
ing the Code of Federal Regulations, the Procedural Manual M-21-1, the BVA Manual, the
Program Guide, the Filed Appellate Procedure Manual MI-I, adjudication memoranda, VA
circulars, informal memoranda, and BVA decisions.
55. Walters, 589 F. Supp. at 1320.
56. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) (1988). The court noted that these two interests might often be
in conflict. Clearly the financial interests might conflict, and VA personnel might feel pressure
to protect the government purse. Walters, 589 F. Supp. at 1320 n.17 (1984).
57. Id. at 1320. Similarly, the district court found that regional offices would receive
higher ratings if they were able to move claims along quickly. Id.
58. Id. at 1320-21.
[Vol. 29
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input into the most critical step of adjudicating their claims. The
VA's statistics over a three year period showed hearings were cru-
cial, since when a personal hearing was held before the BVA, the
claim was almost twice as likely to succeed. 9 However, "in the in-
terests of practicality and conserving limited government resources,"
it appeared that the VA often encouraged applicants to waive the
pre-determination hearing.6" By contrast, the court stated, "a claim-
ant's paid attorney might well advise the claimant not to waive such
a right.""1
c. Conclusion: Risk of Deprivation of Private Interest
and Likelihood that Attorneys Could Avoid Risk of Deprivation
Plus the Private Interest Greater than the Government Interest
The district court in Walters then concluded that no right to
judicial review, the complexity of substance and procedure, the lack
of adequate and fair representation by VA authorized persons, and
the importance of the interest at stake gave "rise to a need for repre-
sentation which [was] as great or greater than that of the welfare
recipients of Goldberg v. Kelly."62 The court also stated that the
government's interest was little or nonexistent because it had failed
to demonstrate that the repeal of the fee limit would harm the gov-
ernment in any way "except as paternalistic protector of the claim-
ant's best interests."6 3 This was supported by the Senate Committee
on Veterans' Affairs determination that modifications of the ten dol-
lar fee limit would not cause added administrative burdens for the
VA." To this extent, the court stated that there were less drastic
means available to assure attorneys' fees would not deplete a vet-
eran's benefits.65
2. Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors6
The United States Supreme Court did not agree with the dis-
trict court for two reasons. First, it stated that invalidation of the fee
limitation would frustrate Congress' goals of 1) the veteran receiving
the entirety of the benefits award without dividing it with an attor-
59. Id. at 1321.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
63. Walters, 589 F. Supp. at 1323.
64. S. REP. No. 130, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1985).
65. Walters, 589 F. Supp. at 1323.
66. 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
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ney and 2) the veterans' benefits process remaining as informal and
non-adversarial as possible.6 7 Second, the Supreme Court found that
the risk of erroneous deprivation of SCDD benefits in the VA's pro-
ceedings and the probability that attorneys would diminish that risk
was not shown to warrant holding that the fee limit denied due
process.6 8
a. The Government Interest in Retaining the Ten Dollar
Fee Limit
The Court began its discussion of the merits by stating that the
Court must always pay great deference to the acts of Congress. 9
The veterans' benefits statute, it felt, deserved more deference be-
cause it had been on the books for over 120 years. 0
The Supreme Court then stated that the government interest in
retaining the ten dollar fee limit was twofold: first, the system for
administering benefits should be managed in such an informal and
non-adversarial way that there would be no need for an attorney7
and second, that no attorney represent the claimant so the claimant
could receive the entirety of his or her award without having to di-
vide it with a lawyer.7 2 The Court quoted the Senate Committee
report of 1982, "that any changes relating to attorneys' fees be made
carefully . . . not to induce unnecessary retention of attorneys ....
[Any change should not] disrupt . . . the very effective network of
nonattorney resources that has evolved in the absence of significant
attorney involvement in VA claims matters."73 To support its posi-
tion, the Court also noted that the proposed bill retained the fee lim-
itation for all VA proceedings up to and including the first denial of
a claim by the BVA "in order to 'protect claimants' benefits' from
being unnecessarily diverted to lawyers."
'74
The admittance of lawyers into VA proceedings was seen as
contrary to maintaining the informal and non-adversarial process.75
The Supreme Court in Walters cited Gagnon v. Scarpelli,76 where
67. Id. at 321-26.
68. Id. at 327-34.
69. Id. at 319.
70. Id. at 321-23.
71. Id. at 323.
72. Id.
73. S. REP. No. 466, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1982).
74. Walters, 473 U.S. at 321 n.10 (quoting S. REP. No. 466, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 50
(1982)).
75. Id. at 323-26.
76. 411 U.S. 778, 787-88 (1973).
[Vol. 29
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the Court stated:
[Tihe introduction of counsel into a revocation proceeding will
alter . . . the proceeding . . [L]awyers . . . are . . . bound
by professional duty to present all available evidence and argu-
ments in support of their clients' positions and to contest with
vigor all adverse evidence . . [the] decision-making process
will be prolonged, and the financial cost to the State-for ap-
pointed counsel, . . a longer record, and the possibility of judi-
cial review-will not be insubstantial."
The Court finally stated that if lawyers were allowed into VA
proceedings, soon a claimant with a factually simple and obvious
claim might feel compelled to retain an attorney simply because ev-
eryone else did. The end result would be that with the additional
complexity leading to greater administrative cost, less government
money would reach the intended beneficiaries.7 8 Thus the Court
gave great weight to the government interest.
b. Need of Strong Showing of Risk of Erroneous
Deprivation of SCDD Benefits Under the Present System and
Likelihood that an Attorney Would Avoid that Risk to Find the Fee
Limit Denies Due Process
The Court printed the chart referred to by the district court7 '
and said the statistics were helpful in showing that success rates by
lawyers were not much higher than other forms of representation.'0
It rejected the district court's claim that since lawyers rarely repre-
sented clients in VA proceedings their success rates were not as good
as if they represented them regularly.
Also, the procedural and substantive factors were not considered
77. However, this case required that a lawyer be appointed because the probationer or
parolee might have difficulty in presenting his version of a disputed set of facts, where the
presentation required the examining or cross-examining of witnesses or offering or dissecting
of complex documentary evidence. Id. at 786-88.
78. Walters, 473 U.S. at 326.
79. Ultimate Success Rates Before the Board of Veterans' Appeals by Mode of
Representation:
American Legion 16.2%
American Red Cross 16.8%
Disabled American Veterans 16.6%
Veterans of Foreign Wars 16.7%
Other Non-attorney 15.8%
No Representation 15.2%
Attorney/Agent 18.3%
Id. at 327.
80. Id. at 331.
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burdensome by the Supreme Court in Walters because one year was
ample time for a claimant to respond to a denial of his or her claim.
In addition, the VA was required to read submissions in the light
most favorable to the claimant, and there were various service repre-
sentatives to see that procedure was complied with.81 However, the
Court admitted that, as the district court had concluded, the service
representatives could not provide all the services that a lawyer
could." But "[n]either the difference in success rate nor the existence
of complexity in some cases is sufficient to warrant a conclusion that
the right to retain and compensate an attorney in VA cases is a nec-
essary element of procedural fairness under the Fifth
Amendment." 8
c. The Private Interest
Finally, the Court compared the benefits at stake in VA pro-
ceedings, which were not granted on the basis of need, to the social
security benefits of Mathews.84 Since this factor was dispositive in
Mathews in determining that no evidentiary hearing was required
prior to the temporary deprivation of benefits, the Court found the
same reasoning determinative of the right to employ counsel.85 The
Court distinguished Goldberg v. Kelly,88 cited by the district court,
stating that there was no policy in New York against permitting an
applicant to divide up his or her welfare award with his or her rep-
resentative attorney, and the Court in Goldberg relied on agency
regulations allowing recipients to retain counsel under some circum-
stances. 87 The Court distinguished Walters from prior cases by stat-
ing that attorneys were required in those cases because of adversary,
trial-type proceedings, but in VA claims where there was no adver-
sary, the claimant was provided with substitute safeguards such as a
competent representative, a decision-maker whose duty it was to aid
the claimant, and significant concessions with respect to the claim-
ant's burden of proof. Therefore, the need for counsel was considera-
bly decreased.88
81. Id. at 329.
82. Id. at 329-30.
83. Id. at 331.
84. Id. at 332-33 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 342-43 (1976)).
85. Id. at 333-34.
86. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
87. Walters, 473 U.S. at 333.
88. Id. at 333-34.
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d. Conclusion: Government Interest Greater than
Private Interest Plus Risk of Deprivation of Private Interest
The Supreme Court concluded, contrary to the district court,
that precedent and congressional intent did not require attorney rep-
resentation in VA proceedings. Also, the government interest in
preventing adversary proceedings and allowing veterans to keep all
their benefits far outweighed any risk of error and the probability
that attorneys would substantially reduce the risk, particularly since
the district court did not show that attorneys would increase success
rates over representation already provided by various organi-
zations. 89
3. National Association of Radiation Survivors v. Walters9"
on Remand
The Walters case was remanded to decide the issue of whether
the ten dollar fee limit on attorneys' fees was valid for veterans with
complicated claims relating to their exposure to radiation. However,
the VA failed to produce documents required by the plaintiffs' attor-
neys to prove a high degree of erroneous decision-making at the
VA.91 As a result of the VA's actions, Federal District Court Judge
Marilyn Patel ordered the VA to pay 1) all the defendants' attor-
neys' fees and costs in connection with the destruction of documents,
2) all attorneys' fees and costs in determining what documents were
destroyed and reconstructing them, if possible, and 3) $15,000 into
the court for wasting its time.92
D. VA Analysis Examines the Validity of VA Proceedings93
In addition'to the district court order by Judge Patel, discovery
in the litigation over the ten dollar fee limit in Walters resulted in an
analysis of the lack of adequate due process in the way the VA han-
dled claims.94 The analysis, in the form of a "white paper'' 9 pre-
89. Id. at 334.
90. No. C83-1861 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 1987).
91. VA Ordered to Pay for Destroying Relevant Records, 6 VETERANS RTS. NEWSL.
65, 67 (Jan./Feb. 1987).
92. Id. at 67. The total fines exceeded $100,000. In addition. the Justice Department
has budgeted $1.25 million to respond to discovery to which the VA will contribute an equal
amount. Coyle, Veterans Adninistration Under Fire, NAT'L L.J. 19 (1987).
93. Procedural Due Process-Its Application to the Compensation and Pension
Program (1985) (Clearinghouse No. 41,761), reprinted in Developments in 1986, supra note
27 at 1209-10.
94. See Developments in 1986, supra note 27, at 1209-10.
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pared by a VA staff attorney, also discussed the failure of the VA to
control the quality of decision-making."
The white paper examined three major problem areas: 1) veter-
ans' failure to receive notice until after denial of an opportunity to
have a hearing, 2) the VA's failure to notify many applicants when
their claims were denied, and 3) the VA's capability of being
manipulated to the benefit of VA managers who receive bonuses
based on the number of cases processed.9" Reports from twenty of
fifty-eight VA stations were examined as part of the analysis. Seven-
teen stations' reports could not be confirmed or validated in at least
one of the major problem areas and five stations failed to validate in
half the areas examined." The analysis concluded that the figures
reported by the local offices were not reliable and that all adjudica-
tion divisions seemed to have serious problems in their review proce-
dures which needed to be "upgraded.""
The analysis also concluded that "managers [were] attempting
to 'overcome' the current management evaluation system" and as a
result were leaving certain areas "constitutionally vulnerable" such
as the furnishing of award and disallowance letters. 00 The VA staff
attorney's research uncovered ". . . not only a pattern of inadequate
notification letters, but a pattern involving claims where there was
no evidence that the claimant [had been] notified at all."101
Finally, the VA white paper found a pattern of claims being
delayed, improperly developed, and prematurely denied, in part, to
present a better statistical picture of local adjudication centers.0 2
III. ANALYSIS
According to recent developments and facts which the Supreme
Court did not to consider, the private interest is actually greater than
perceived by the Supreme Court in Walters. It contributes to tipping
95. "White paper" means: 1. A government report on any subject, 2. A detailed or
authoritative report. A "white book" is an official report of government affairs bound in white.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2607, 2609 (15th ed. 1967).
96. See supra note 93.
97. See supra note 93.
98. See supra note 93.
99. See supra note 93.
100. See supra note 93.
101. See supra note 93.
102. See supra note 93. In addition to the VA analysis, a settlement agreement is pend-
ing in an Illinois case that was filed to attack the VA's failure to provide predetermination
notice to a pension recipient. Semenchuck v. Walters, 1 V.L.R. (Veterans Education Project)
3501 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
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the due process "scale" the other way, along with the increase in the
risk of erroneous deprivation and the likelihood that attorneys could
prevent that risk, to outweigh the government interest which is now
very minimal or nonexistent. The Supreme Court decision in Wal-
ters still stands even though the factors in the test for due process
have changed in importance. The decision is an added barrier to
abolishing the outdated ten dollar fee limit.
If the Supreme Court's decision in Walters is part of the prob-
lem, the district court's reasoning in Walters is part of the answer.
New developments, including an analysis of the VA showing its con-
stitutional vulnerability, the VA's actions which resulted in the order
that required the VA to pay costs, fees, and money to the court for
destruction of documents and wasting the court's time, and the Assis-
tant Attorney General's ruling that third parties may hire attorneys
to represent veterans, combine to strengthen the California district
court's reasoning in Walters.
A. The Private Interest Affected by the Ten Dollar Fee Limit and
the Effectiveness of Attorneys in Protecting that Interest
The district court in Walters considered the private interest to
be substantial because many of the plaintiffs were totally or primar-
ily dependent on SCDD benefits,103 and the VA proceedings were
the only remedy against the government.' 4 As support for its belief
that attorneys would avoid the risk of erroneous deprivation of
SCDD benefits and help in procedural and substantive matters, the
district court cited Goldberg v. Kelly which required welfare recipi-
ents to be permitted to retain counsel prior to termination of benefits
because attorneys could delineate issues, present orderly factual con-
tentions, conduct cross examination, and generally safeguard the re-
cipient's interests' 05
This reasoning must be compared to the Supreme Court's rea-
sons for finding the private interest to be minimal. First, the Su-
preme Court used Mathews v. Eldridge, which stated that because
social security benefits were not based on need, an evidentiary hear-
ing was not required prior to their temporary deprivation. This was
used as support for finding no right to employ counsel in veterans'
proceedings since SCDD benefits were not based on need.1"6 How-
103. See supra note 46.
104. Walters, 589 F. Supp. at 1314.
105. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270-71.
106. Walters, 473 U.S. at 333-34.
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ever, the Supreme Court failed to mention that there was no prohibi-
tion against hiring an attorney in the social security hearing in Ma-
thews.'07 As mentioned in the introduction of this comment, both
FECA and social security proceedings are not based on need, but on
disability as in veterans' hearings. Both types of proceedings allow
for representation by attorneys with the only fee limit being reasona-
bleness,"0 8 This is another point which the Supreme Court failed to
discuss and explain.
Second, the Supreme Court distinguished Goldberg by stating
that there was no policy in New York against permitting an appli-
cant to divide a welfare award with his or her attorney.' 0 9 The Su-
preme Court completely ignored the language in Goldberg which
was cited by the district court and described the importance of attor-
neys in protecting a claimant's interests."0 Third, the Supreme
Court distinguished Walters from prior cases by saying that attor-
neys were required in those cases because of adversary, trial-type
proceedings."' This reasoning is not convincing since attorneys may
represent claimants in other informal, non-adversarial government
benefits proceedings such as the social security proceedings in Ma-
thews and the welfare proceedings in Goldberg."2
Finally, the Supreme Court stated that the claimant was pro-
vided with substitute safeguards in the VA to protect the claimant's
interest."' This reasoning is especially weak now that an analysis of
the VA has revealed that there are patterns of inadequate notifica-
tion to claimants," 4 and that claims are often delayed or improperly
developed in order to present a better statistical picture of local adju-
dication centers."
5
B. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation of SCDD Benefits and the
Likelihood that Attorneys Would Prevent that Risk
The incomplete reasoning of the Supreme Court produces a pic-
ture of a substantial private interest which is affected by the ten dol-
lar fee limit and which can be effectively protected by attorneys. In
107. See supra note 3.
108. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
109. Waiters, 473 U.S..at 333.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 333-34.
112. See supra note 20, at 785..
113. Waiters, 473 U.S. at 333-34.
114. See supra note 93.
115. See supra note 93.
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addition, the district court's conclusion that there was a risk of erro-
neous deprivation of veterans' benefits and a likelihood that an attor-
ney would avoid that risk was reasonable because it was based on
factual representations that the VA proceedings were not constitu-
tionally valid. The district court based its holding on the fact that the
VA rarely subpoenaed documents (only five times since 1979) to
support a claimant's claim. 16 The conclusion was also based on the
fact that the VA undercut the procedural right to a hearing until
after initial determination had been made, even though this pre-
vented the plaintiffs from having input into the most important step
of adjudicating their claims, and during this stage the BVA was al-
most twice as likely to grant benefits.'
Then, the district court adequately supported its conclusion that
an attorney could prevent the risk of erroneous deprivation. The
court first noted that, in contrast to other government benefits hear-
ings, the claimant in SCDD proceedings had no right to judicial re-
view under 38 U.S.C. § 211(a), and that the ten dollar fee limit
applied to post-termination proceedings."' Although veterans may
now appeal BVA decisions to the new specialty court set out in S.
11, the standard for review may be difficult for veterans to meet. The
court may only review BVA decisions if they are "clearly errone-
ous." The future will show whether the new court and standard of
review provide effective judicial review for veterans and therefore
lessen the need for lifting the ten dollar fee limit in the initial SCDD
process. The future will also show whether the new court merely
renames the BVA and cuts off veterans from further appeals," 9
which would strengthen the need for lifting the ten dollar fee limit in
the initial SCDD proceedings.
According to the district court, attorneys could help in develop-
ing complex substantive issues and in dealing with profuse proce-
dural materials since VA examiners were allowed only 2.84 hours to
develop the facts, and performance was measured in part by the
speed with which they processed claims.' This appears even more
obvious now that a recent analysis of the VA procedures has found
that the VA is capable of being manipulated to the benefit of VA
managers who receive bonuses based on numbers of cases
116. Walters, 589 F. Supp. at 1320-21.
117. Id. at 1321.
118. Id. at 1317.
119. Opponents of the new court and its standard of review expressed this concern.
Cowen, Panel Agrees to Judicial Review for Veterans, 46 CoNG. Q. 2590 (1988).
120. Walters, 589 F. Supp. at 1320.
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processed."' 1 This implies that the VA representatives are not partic-
ularly careful in representing veterans' claims since the number of
claims processed is more important than quality development of
those claims. The VA white paper also concluded that claims were
inadequately processed to present a better picture of local adjudica-
tion, 22 which supports the district court's belief that VA representa-
tives may feel pressure to support the conflicting financial interests of
the government and, as a result, fail to be adequate representatives of
the veterans' claims.12
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, found that the proce-
dural and substantive factors were not burdensome because one year
was ample time for a claimant to respond to a denial of a claim for
benefits, the VA was required to read submissions in the light most
favorable to the claimant, and there were service representatives to
see that procedure was complied with.1 4 The Supreme Court did
admit that the representatives could not provide all the services that
a lawyer could,"O and this appears more evident in the recent analy-
sis of the VA which concluded that it is "constitutionally vulnera-
ble."' 26 One year is not ample time if, as the analysis found, a claim-
ant is not given proper notification of the progress of his or her
claim. 1 It also appears from the VA analysis that the submissions
are not read in the light most favorable to the veteran, and the ser-
vice representatives are not adequate in supervising procedural re-
quirements since representatives are given bonuses on the quantity
rather than quality of claims they process and are mote interested in
presenting a favorable picture of their divisions' adjudication
processes.128
The Supreme Court noted that attorneys could not prevent any
risk of erroneous deprivation, even if there was a risk of deprivation,
by'citing the district court's chart"' which cited attorneys as having
only about a one percent higher success rate before the BVA than
other means of representation. However, the district court's reason-
ing that this figure was not higher because there were fewer attorney
represented proceedings before the BVA so that attorneys had not
121. See supra note 93.
122. See supra note 93.
123. Waiters, 589 F. Supp. at 1320 n.7.
124. Waiters, 473 U.S. at 329.
125. ld.
126. See supra note 93.
127. See supra note 93.
128. See supra note 93.
129. See supra note 79.
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had enough practice to be more successful, lessens the strength of the
Supreme Court's finding that attorneys were not an adequate means
of protecting veterans' interests.
C. The Government Interest in Retaining the Ten Dollar Fee
Limit
The.Present risk of erroneous deprivation of due process that
could be prevented by attorney representation, plus the private inter-
est, could only be outweighed by a strong government interest. The
district court found no strong government interest in retaining the
ten dollar fee limit because the government had failed to demonstrate
that the repeal of the limit would harm the government except as
paternalistic protector of the claimant's best interests. 3 ' The Senate
Committee on Veterans' Affairs' belief that the repeal of the limit
would cause no significant administrative burdens to the VA sup-
ports the district court's finding. 3' The district court noted that
there were less drastic means available to assure attorneys' fees
would not deplete veterans' benefits.' 32 This is supported by the
FECA and social security proceedings which are non-adversarial, as
are SCDD proceedings, and which provide that attorneys' fees are
only'limited by reasonableness.' 3
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, found the government
interest to be very strong because of 1) Congress' intent that the at-
torney not receive a large portion of the veteran's award,3 2) Con-
gress' goal of maintaining informal and non-adversarial VA proceed-
ings,135  and 3) the government's desire to prevent higher
administrative costs so that VA money would continue to reach the
intended beneficiaries.' 6
The Supreme Court's first line of reasoning behind the govern-
ment interest, that attorneys would receive too much of the veteran's
award, is outdated because it does not represent current social and
economic conditions. The Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs has
stated that, in view of today's bar which polices attorneys' practices,
the fee limit is no longer needed.' 7 The Senate has even proposed
130. Walters, 589 F. Supp. at 1328.
131. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
132. Walters, 589 F. Supp. at 1329.
133. See supra note 3.
134. Walters, 473 U.S. at 322-23.
135. Id. at 323-24.
136. Id. at 326.
137. See supra note 64.
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amendments to the limit which include a reasonable fee not in excess
of $500.188 These amendments reflect the original congressional in-
tent behind the fee limit because they raise the fee to present eco-
nomic standards"3 9 and provide adequate pay for attorney represen-
tation now that the proceedings are much more complicated both
procedurally and substantively than in 1864, when the fee limit was
first introduced.
14 0
The Supreme Court's second line of reasoning behind the gov-
ernment interest, maintaining informal, non-adversarial veterans'
proceedings, is now weakened by the Assistant Attorney General's
decision that disinterested third parties may hire attorneys without
violation of the fee limitation.1 41 If third parties may hire attorneys
without causing unneeded formalities and adversarial proceedings,
then this is no longer a problem and likewise no longer a govern-
ment interest to be protected.
The Supreme Court viewed attorneys as causing delay and con-
fusion in SCDD processes rather than efficiency and clarification, 4 2
citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli where the Supreme Court stated that
counsel at a probation revocation proceeding would prolong the pro-
cess, cause more financial cost to the state, and create a longer rec-
ord. 4 However, the Assistant Attorney General's opinion does not
mention these problems as limits on disinterested third parties pay-
ing attorneys to represent veterans. The decision only requires that
there be a retainer agreement between the third party and the attor-
ney which recites the language of sections 3404 and 3405 and in-
cludes a declaration that no payments to the attorney will directly or
indirectly decrease the veteran's benefits.1 44 The decision also says
that there must be a separate document showing the veteran's ac-
knowledgement of the latter statement. 5
Without the intent to protect veterans' benefits from unscrupu-
lous attorneys and the attorneys' contribution to complexity in veter-
ans' benefits proceedings, the government interest described by the
Supreme Court in Walters is greatly weakened. However, the rea-
138. See supra note 26.
139. See supra note 2.
140. See supra note 25.
141. See supra note 33.
142. Walters, 473 U.S. at 323-25.
143. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-88 (1973).
144. See U.S. Agrees Lawyers Can Be Paid Over $10 on VA Claims, supra note 33 at
86.
145. See U.S. Agress Lawyers Can Be paid Over $10 on VA Claims, supra note 33 at
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soning that attorney representation would cause greater administra-
tive cost so that less money would reach the intended beneficiaries is
also relevant to the government interest. In Walters on remand, dis-
trict court Judge Marilyn Patel ordered the VA to pay fees, costs,
and $15,000 to the court as a result of its failure to produce docu-
ments for discovery on the issue of whether the ten dollar fee limit
on attorney representation was valid for veterans with complicated
claims relating to their exposure to radiation.1"' The VA's actions
defeated the purpose of minimizing administrative cost when they
resulted in the payment of large damages. If the system can support
the cost of paying damages, it could easily support the introduction
of attorneys into its proceedings.
Thus, the government interest in retaining the ten dollar fee
limit is minimal or nonexistent as the district court in Walters found.
It is easily outweighed by the substantial private interest involved
plus the risk of erroneous deprivation and the likelihood that an at-
torney would avoid that risk, so the statute should be found unconsti-
tutional as the district court held in Walters.
IV. PROPOSAL
New developments and the fact that the Supreme Court failed
to consider factual realities, the content of the Senate hearings, and
the original congressional intent behind the ten dollar fee limit un-
dermine the validity of the Supreme Court's decision in Walters. On
the other hand, these same elements strengthen the reasoning of the
district court in Walters. It is the district court's reasoning that
should be followed by the courts and Congress. The reasoning
should be used to find the statute unconstitutional so that alternative
means can be developed to ensure that attorneys' fees are not too
high when representing veterans in SCDD proceedings.
However, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will reverse its
decision in Walters. It is the responsibility of Congress to amend 38
U.S.C. § 3404(c)(2). Congress should look to the FECA and social
security statutes which involve proceedings where the award of bene-
fits is not based on need but on disability, just like veterans' benefits
awards, and which provide that the only limit on attorneys' fees be
reasonableness.
The amended statute should abolish the ten dollar fee limit
clause'4 7 and read:
146. No. C83-1861 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 1987).
147. See supra note 14.
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The Administrator shall determine and pay fees to agents or
attorneys recognized under this section in allowed claims for
monetary benefits under laws administered by the Veterans'
Administration. Such fees (1) shall be determined and paid as
prescribed by the Administrator; (2) shall not exceed a reasona-
ble fee to compensate such agent or attorney for the services
performed by him or her in connection with such claim; (3)
shall be deducted from monetary benefits claimed and allowed;
and (4) the recommended fee limit in 1989 shall be $750,146
such fee being reviewed yearly to ensure that it corresponds
with current economic conditions.
V. CONCLUSION
A fee limit for attorneys representing veterans in veterans' bene-
fits proceedings determined by 1) reasonableness and 2) current eco-
nomic conditions would accurately reflect the federal government's
goal of doing everything possible to help the veteran readjust to civil-
ian life.' 49 It would also help veterans receive due process in attain-
ing SCDD benefits because attorneys would not be discouraged from
handling veterans' claims because of a ridiculously low fee of ten
dollars. A fee based on these two considerations would also allow
attorneys to be compensated appropriately for their work in develop-
ing the difficult substantive and procedural aspects of veterans'
claims.
The FECA and social security proceedings for benefits which
allow for representation of counsel with no fee limit are not based on
need, but on disability as in veterans' benefits proceedings. The pro-
posed amendments to § 3404(c)(2), as opposed to the ten dollar limit,
would allow veterans to have a right to hire attorneys which is equal
to the rights of FECA and social security claimants.
However, the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled
that a ten dollar attorneys' fee limit is constitutional and provides
adequate due process to veterans in SCDD proceedings. The Su-
preme Court's decision is a problem because it discourages the enact-
ment of legislation which would more accurately reflect the govern-
ment's paramount goal of helping the veteran readjust to civilian life.
It is a goal which the Supreme Court ignored, but the district court
in California supported. The district court decided that the substan-
148. This amount is based on a suggested fee limit which was originally included in S.
11. Cowen, supra note 119.
149. See supra note 1.
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tial private interest in SCDD benefits plus the risk of erroneous dep-
rivation of those benefits and the likelihood that an attorney would
prevent the risk of erroneous deprivation outweighed the government
interest in maintaining the limit. The district court's reasoning is
supported by recent developments which, conversely, undermine the
Supreme Court's holding so that the ten dollar fee limit should now
be abolished.
However, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will overrule its
decision in Walters. It is Congress' responsibility to enact a fee limit
which abolishes the ten dollar constriction and replaces it with a
limit based on reasonableness and current economic conditions. This
would ensure fair veterans' benefits proceedings and fulfill the
United States government's most important goal behind veterans'
legislation, which is to meet the needs of those who are disabled as a
result of military service for the United States of America.
Marguerite R. Caruso

